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Resistance or Parasitism?  Waste Scavengers and Dengue Mosquito Control in Nicaragua 
Alex M. Nading 
University of Edinburgh 
 
Abstract 
In this chapter, I describe the response of urban Nicaraguan garbage scavengers to the Plan 
Chatarra, a Ministry of Health effort to effect dengue mosquito control by sanctioning the trade 
in recyclable waste.  Occurring during a volatile period for the global garbage economy, as well 
as alongside an intense struggle for rights to waste within Nicaragua, the Plan Chatarra is an 
example of how global health problems articulate with wider social and economic events.   In 
Nicaragua’s waste controversy, global dengue prevention policy was certainly at issue, but it was 
almost never directly addressed by the actors involved.  Analyzing the Plan Chatarra 
ethnographically, I argue that the relationship between local populations and global health 
initiatives might best be seen not as one of binary domination and resistance but of 
multidirectional “parasitism.” 
 
Ciudad Sandino, Nicaragua, a community of over 100,000 residents just north of 
Managua, is home to plenty of mosquitoes, and it contains plenty of places for them to hide and 
breed.  Ciudad Sandino is divided into fourteen neighborhoods, known as zonas.  The zonas are 
comprised of uniform ten- by thirty-meter houselots, each directly abuting the next.  Ae. aegypti 
mosquitoes, which transmit the dengue virus among humans, prefer to breed in such close-knit 
spaces.  Female Ae. aegypti tend to lay their eggs water basins, sinks, gutters, and sometimes in 
accumulated household waste. The adult female of the species is capable of carrying the dengue 
virus, which has become a growing public health threat across urban Latin America. Indeed, 
dengue is so common in urban Nicaragua that most human adults—whether or not they know 
it—have likely been exposed to the virus by the time they reach twenty years of age (Standish, et 
al. 2010).  The dengue virus infects over 250 million people per year, from Singapore to South 
Florida.  It is the most prevalent mosquito-borne disease in the world. 
This chapter draws on fieldwork I conducted in Ciudad Sandino between 2006 and 2011 
to discuss the relationship of household waste to global dengue prevention strategies (Nading 
2014).  In Ciudad Sandino, where formal unemployment ranges from 50 to 75 percent, 
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scavenging and selling recyclable materials is a common livelihood strategy (Hartmann 2012).  
The garbage trade is a frequent target of Nicaragua’s national dengue control policy. In 2008, an 
ongoing political struggle over waste management in Ciudad Sandino became entangled with an 
ongoing dengue fever epidemic.  By tracing this entanglement, I argue that the relationship 
between local populations and global health initiatives might best be seen not as one of binary 
domination and resistance but of multidirectional “parasitism” (Serres 2007).  In Ciudad 
Sandino’s urban waste controversy, global dengue prevention policy was certainly at issue, but it 
was almost never directly addressed by the actors involved. 
 
Source Reduction 
I am trudging slowly behind a garbage truck as it winds through Zona 10.  At first, the 
process of collection seems familiar and tedious. Recolectores (they are all men) pick up bags of 
refuse in each house, transfer their contents to a truck or trailer bed, and walk off to the next 
house. Things get more interesting when the bed fills up. That is when we load up and drive to 
the municipal dump. 
Ciudad Sandino’s dump is a disused farm field. There are two ways in and out. One is by 
municipal vehicle: usually a white Toyota dump truck.  Garbage truck drivers prefer to go in and 
out rapidly. In the dry season, this means that the recolectores who ride atop the mounds of 
refuse in the exposed bed become shrouded in a fine red dust. In the rainy season, the trucks 
splash through mud puddles, and chances are high that the vehicles will become stuck in the 
furrows of the dump, which sits adjacent to an outlying zona called Nueva Vida. 
Before unloading the garbage, most crews make a quick stop on the entrance road that 
divides the field from Nueva Vida. There, the recolectores in the bed jump out and jog into a 
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nearby house, a structure made of wood and sheet metal surrounded by a flimsy fence of 
immature tree trunks and a few strands of rusty barbed wire, spilling into the ditch (cauce) that 
separates the barrio from the entrance road. The recolectores haul massive plastic grain sacks 
filled with their day’s catch of chatarra. (Chatarra, literally “junk,” is the omnibus term in 
Nicaragua for recyclable materials, from plastic bottles to cans, copper wiring, scrap iron, and 
paper.) A woman in the house will weigh and buy these items. While awaiting payment from the 
buyer (or chatarrero), the recolectores might cross paths with garbage scavengers like Doña 
Flor, a fiftyish woman who works in the dump picking out the recyclables that the crews leave 
behind. 
On this day, I decide to say goodbye to the truck and crew and accompany Doña Flor to 
her house. She leads me on the other route out of the dump and into Nueva Vida. She walks 
slowly, a spiked metal prod for sifting through rubbish piles balanced on her shoulder. For me, 
her pace through the barrio, shaded from the sun that scorches the treeless dump, is as refreshing 
in its ease as the rides on the garbage trucks were in their briskness. She shares her house with 
two sons and a few grandchildren. The house, too, has a flimsy barbed wire fence enclosing piles 
of recyclables. The piles grow and shrink inversely with the market prices of the materials they 
contain. 
Over the weeks and months, recyclables move in and out of her house and in and out of 
Ciudad Sandino in a waste stream that flows from scavengers to small buyers, on to large 
brokers in Managua, and ultimately to faraway ports on other continents. The stream bears 
money, people, and product brand identities. Insects also ride along. Ae. aegypti mosquitoes 
sometimes lay eggs in the things Doña Flor and others collect.  
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Ae. aegypti is more difficult to control than its malaria-spreading distant cousins in genus 
Anopheles because it occupies the intimate, private spaces people call home. Given its 
adaptability to households and their surroundings, controlling Ae. aegypti—and thus controlling 
dengue fever—requires, first, that communities have effective water and waste management. 
Second, someone must inform individuals about the mosquito and its breeding habits and 
convince them that they should be on the lookout for potential breeding sites.  In the absence of 
an effective dengue vaccine, these two priorities, waste/water management and mosquito control, 
have made a house-to-house mosquito “source reduction” strategy the only globally accepted 
strategy for preventing dengue. The goal of this strategy is to make the urban environment 
unwelcoming to the mosquito by encouraging people, through a combination of insecticide 
application, public education, and law enforcement, to rid their homes of potential breeding sites, 
or “sources,” including waste.  
This approach dates back to the earliest days of mosquito control, and it hinges on a 
feedback between perceptions of collective risk and personal responsibility (Carter 2012; Beck 
1992; Peterson and Lupton 1996). Managing this feedback has long been key part of public 
health across Latin America. As Charles Briggs and Clara Mantini-Briggs suggest, ideas about 
who is capable of contemplating and acting on health risk and who, by dint of racial, ethnic, or 
gendered discrimination, is doomed to be victimized or demonized, constitute a domain of 
“sanitary citizenship” (2003: 319–20).  In the case of dengue, the making of sanitary citizens 
means fostering a recognition that things, people, and mosquitoes are entangled, and determining 
differing levels of responsibility for managing that entanglement (Nading 2012). 
During my fieldwork, I witnessed dozens of campaigns led by the Nicaraguan Ministry of 
Health (Ministerio de Salud, henceforth, MINSA) in which doctors, garbage collectors, and 
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community health workers (brigadistas) exhorted homeowners to discard the plastic, rubber, and 
scrap metal piled in their homes. Brigadistas walked alongside the garbage trucks, reminding 
residents that mosquitoes like to breed in the pools of rainwater that form in those piles, and that 
there was neither a cure nor an effective vaccine for dengue.  They spoke vividly about the 
consequences of inaction: the spread of a virus that causes hemorrhagic fevers, physical 
impairment, and even death. But the campaigns failed to create a consensus among residents 
about how to stop dengue from spreading. Instead, they aggravated social divisions among health 
workers, city garbage collectors, and garbage scavengers. These divisions arose not over how to 
define the disease (no one disputed that dengue was a problem) but over how to foster 
community participation, how to manage space, and how to balance resources and hazards. In 
short, they were about the limits to sanitary citizenship. 
In Ciudad Sandino, as in other places, waste has long been a focus of source reduction 
efforts, whether in one-off cleanup campaigns or in more routine house-to-house mosquito 
control efforts. While some have posited links between inadequate solid waste control and 
dengue, those links tend to be over-simplified. Studies tend to characterize the wastes that can 
become mosquito-breeding sites as problems typical of “consumer societies” (Ashencaenen-
Crabtree, Wong, and Mas’ud 2001; Gubler 1989). Discourses about the “choice” to scavenge or 
otherwise harbor garbage that might play host to mosquitoes spin an “apolitical” narrative of 
dengue ecology (Robbins 2012).  What is missing is an investigation of how global economic 
pressures and social relationships entangle the social lives of mosquitoes and people with those 
of nonliving materials, making the ideal of sanitary citizenship impossible to achieve. 
 
Garbage Economies, Disease Ecologies 
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The year 2008 saw two turning points in the relationships between Ciudad Sandino’s 
garbage scavengers, its mosquitoes, and the Nicaraguan state. The first turning point came in 
March, when scavengers organized blockades of the dumps in Ciudad Sandino and nearby 
Managua. Until 2006, the scavengers had a nearly uncontested claim to garbage of value, but 
persistent poverty and a spike in global demand for recyclables changed both the geography and 
the demography of scavenging. From late 2005 to mid-2008, worldwide prices for recyclable 
materials soared. City garbage collectors, whose work gave them easy access to the waste 
stream, took special advantage of the boom, picking up large amounts of plastic, metal, and 
aluminum on their daily routes. This on-route recycling sparked the scavengers’ protests. For 
several days, they lobbed rocks at city vehicles that dared to enter the dumps. They demanded 
that city leaders order garbage collectors to stop selecting and selling recyclables during their 
work routes (Hartmann 2012). 
Both scavengers and garbage collectors recognized not only that without their labor, 
recyclables could not realize their market value, but also that without their efforts, the city could 
not come close to being clean. Although both groups tried to secure exclusive access to garbage 
of value, neither found a satisfying way to convince the city government that it deserved rights to 
collect. Both groups were trying to secure their positions as what scholars of Latin American 
politics call “clients” to powerful “patrons” in the city government.  Elaborated in the 
postindependence period, the concept of patron-clientelism helps explain how wealth and power 
become distributed systematically across spaces that government institutions cannot reach. In the 
ideal-typical version, “patrons” use wealth and generosity to mobilize the labor of poorer clients, 
who reciprocate with political loyalty. Importantly, individuals may play the role of both patron 
and client simultaneously. A small-time patron may in turn be the client of an even more 
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powerful person. At each level, people sacrifice their individual rights as citizens for material 
goods.  A system based on patron-clientelism—as Ciudad Sandino’s garbage economy largely 
was—is somewhat at odds with ideas of sanitary citizenship, as well as with a free and open 
market.  The scavengers saw city leaders’ tacit approval of the garbage collectors’ actions as a 
violation of an implied moral contract. They, not the collectors, deserved to pick up the city’s 
valuable wastes. 
But the situation was not that simple. Though the garbage collectors appeared to hold 
familiar, modern public works jobs, they depended on strong relationships with political bosses 
for their job security. Civic leaders, likewise, needed someone to keep the city minimally clean. 
Their patronage was not simple generosity. They, too, depended on formal and informal garbage 
collectors to validate their own political legitimacy. 
If the dump conflict marked the first turning point in the relationships between garbage 
scavengers, mosquitoes, and the state, then the Plan Chatarra, a nationwide campaign devised by 
MINSA in 2008 to ban scavenging and garbage trading from city centers and relegate it to areas 
far from homes and shops, marked the second. The implication of the Plan Chatarra was clear: 
trash was dirty; dirt bred bugs; bugs carried disease to people; concentrations of trash must also 
lead to concentrations of dengue. One official emphasized in the conservative daily newspaper 
La Prensa that “chatarreras are sites of large mosquito breeding areas. . . . [These] businesses 
have exposed more of the population to . . . dengue.”1 Patron-client relations were central to the 
chatarra business as well. Large, well-capitalized chatarra buyers in Managua would routinely 
sponsor smaller buyers. These smaller buyers, in turn, would work to develop reputations among 
scavengers as fair-minded and generous in their payouts. 
Both the disputes at the dump and the Plan Chatarra reveal how persons and things and 
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creatures that look singular can have multiple identities. The work of collecting and circulating 
garbage was a mode of personal survival that, paradoxically, threatened population health. 
Garbage scavengers were alternately the cause of and the solution to the dengue crisis. The state 
and the health ministry seemed to be acting both to promote the welfare of the city’s poorest 
residents and to undermine it. 
It is certainly not news that some city dwellers, from North Carolina to Nicaragua to 
Nairobi, survive by scavenging for garbage of value, but from late 2005 until the global financial 
meltdown of 2008, the world market for recyclables reached unprecedented heights (Medina 
2008:3). As market prices for recyclables went up, the number of scavengers also increased, and 
scavengers saw their claims to that material deteriorate rather than improve. From just ten 
licensed chatarreras in 2005, the city counted twenty-six by the end of 2008. Scavengers I 
interviewed in 2008 told me that increased competition during the price boom caused their 
earnings for an eight-hour workday to drop to a low of just thirty córdobas (roughly $1.50) from 
a high of more than one hundred córdobas. The average adult supported at least three family 
members.2 The entanglement of human bodies with mosquitoes and garbage was thus mediated 
by economic volatility. Just as dengue epidemics can spike rapidly in unexpected places due to 
circulation of people, viruses, and materials and then recede with little warning, global prices for 
aluminum, steel, plastics, and paper rise and fall with impressive speed. Over the course of 2008, 
Nicaragua’s garbage trade reached a climax, producing up to forty million dollars for the 
national economy.3 Later that year, in the wake of the global economic crisis, the business 
crashed. It was during the boom, however, that the protest in the dumps occurred and the Plan 
Chatarra was put into action. 
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Garbage, Abjection, and Conflict 
Around 1998, after rains from Hurricane Mitch flooded homes on the shores of Lake 
Managua, government resettlement plans moved some scavengers to Ciudad Sandino. “We kept 
scavenging,” one scavenger said of the move. “Back then there was lots of garbage coming in, 
and no one else bothered with it.” People had been making a living by scavenging since the 
opening of Managua’s large open-air dump in 1972. (The Nicaraguan term for “garbage 
scavenger,” churequero, comes from the nickname for Managua’s dump, “La Chureca.”) After 
the hurricane, many of those who had been resettled would pack material from Ciudad Sandino 
and drive it to Managua, where buyers paid better prices.   
Everyone involved in the trade kept up with the prices for different materials, from 
plastic and paper on the cheaper end to copper and bronze on the higher end. The key to being a 
good chatarrero and cultivating a base of client churequeros was a reputation not just for prices 
that matched the accepted daily rate but for fair weights and measures. Churequeros quickly 
turned on patrons whom they considered dishonest, and chatarreros were careful to inspect sacks 
of material before payment, looking for rocks and sand hidden within to increase their weight 
and value. 
As these checks and balances developed, a steady supply of waste streamed into Ciudad 
Sandino. Trucks from nearby apparel factories established in free trade zones (zonas francas) 
carted scrap shoe soles, shredded fabric, and giant plastic packing sacks—all recyclable, all 
valuable—into the dump. In the early years of the new century, the number of zonas francas was 
growing. During the same period, municipal solid waste was becoming more saturated with 
valuable items. 
It was at this time that, among Ciudad Sandino’s churequeros, a labor organization of 
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sorts emerged—albeit one with no clear leader.  The churequeros started to come to the 
consensus that the city garbage collectors’ poaching of the waste stream had become intolerable. 
When I asked why the scavengers had organized, their answers were framed moral terms.  Going 
into the dump every day and collecting for eight to ten hours was preferable to working on the 
streets. This hard work, in a recognizable workplace, helped keep people away from drugs and 
crime. In a city where formal employment was difficult to find, churequeando was a morally 
acceptable alternative to other “underground” methods of making a living.  Churequeros did not 
understand why city leaders should undermine this by allowing city collectors, who already had 
paying jobs, to scavenge.  Churequeros who ventured into the streets to look for chatarra were 
seen as “delinquents,” “thieves,” and “vagrants.” As either undereducated young people or 
“older” (i.e., older than thirty) adults, churequeros’ chances of securing formal employment in 
places like the zonas francas were small. Churequeros, in other words, were cut out of a new 
system of trade and work that had allowed cheap, recyclable materials to proliferate in 
Nicaragua. Recalling the older form of trade and work, they asserted that their work in the dump 
was a contribution to the city. “Put it this way,” one churequero told me: “How would it be if we 
didn’t live this way? We’d really be the worst city in Nicaragua.” 
The city-employed garbage collectors, by contrast, all belonged to an established and 
powerful labor union, historically dominated by loyalists to the Frente Sandinista de Liberación 
Nacional (FLSN), the party that led Nicaragua’s 1979 left-wing revolution.  The FSLN’s leader, 
Daniel Ortega, was elected president in 2006, 16 years after the defeat of the Revolution.  
Union activists argued that what churequeros did was not really “work.”  As Ulrich 
Schilz, Managua’s sanitation supervisor, declared in an editorial published in the normally left-
leaning newspaper El Nuevo Diario, “The churequeros are not workers; they are informal 
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businesspeople who sell their labor to no one. They exploit themselves, a few with great success. 
. . . The only one who gives value to a product is the worker. . . . In this case, the product is the 
organization and cleaning of garbage. . . . The agents of the informal, opportunistic economy 
don’t add any value to this product.”4  From the union’s point of view, the churequeros were not 
working in cooperation with a party or a government. They were parasites, living on the margins 
of the city.  Unionized collectors represented themselves more positively, as underpaid and 
overworked providers of a “service.” The city could never pay them enough in cash for the 
service they rendered. It owed them the chance to make extra money by recycling. 
Yet senses of moral obligation among city collectors were more complex. Don Nelson, a 
garbage truck driver, confessed in an interview: “I don’t really think we should be doing it, and 
we didn’t do it so much before. The churequeros are poor and they live on the garbage. But I . . . 
let the others [the recolectores, who put garbage into the truck] recycle. They don’t earn as much 
money as I do; they also need the income.” Don Nelson was ambivalent about the union’s 
defense of scavenging. As an economic resource, garbage was, at least intuitively, “for” those 
really in need.  The churequeros were precisely the kinds of people that the Sandinista revolution 
was supposed to bring into the community of citizens. The churequeros were not simply 
economic adversaries, and the government patrons were not simply distributors of resources. 
The dump protests ended in a partial victory for the garbage collectors’ union. Each 
collecting crew, led by a truck driver, negotiated with the churequeros about which materials it 
would salvage and sell and which it would leave for those in the dump. Even before dengue 
entered the picture, the politics of chatarra in Ciudad Sandino centered on a set of contradictions. 
Was waste a collective nuisance or a privatizable resource? Could it be both? If waste was a 
nuisance or, worse, a threat to public health, what would best control it, state regulation or a 
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more streamlined market?  The Plan Chatarra, which went into effect just weeks after the 
settlement of the dump strike, only piled on the paradoxes. 
 
The Plan Chatarra 
Chatarreros saw the Plan Chatarra as scapegoating. In a June 2008 meeting at Ciudad 
Sandino’s main health center, they asked repeatedly for “proof” that their businesses were sites 
of mosquito propagation. “We fumigate,” they said. “We have sanitary licenses from the city, 
from MINSA.” “Why this sudden change in the rules?” “How come we are being held 
responsible now if we know dengue affects us every year?” 
The health center’s director, wielding a dry erase marker, tried to explain the health 
implications of Nicaragua’s garbage economy for his audience. “You see,” he began, “there are 
large brokerages, medium brokerages, and small—we say ‘family’—brokerages.” He drew 
parallel horizontal lines on the board to schematically indicate the medium and small brokerages. 
As he descended, each line became longer, forming a pyramid. Then, below the last line, which 
indicated the “family” brokerages, he began making vertical, slashing hash marks, indicating that 
they were more numerous than the large and medium ones. “What’s the problem with all these 
small brokerages? They are inside the barrios, inside the . . . center of the city.” He circled one of 
his hash marks, making dots around it. “There are houses, businesses, schools.” He paused, 
almost like a preacher or a schoolteacher giving a scolding. “And what happens when an infected 
mosquito…lives there?” He paused again. Having temporarily silenced the room, he went on to 
give an extensive recap of the life cycle of the Ae. aegypti mosquito, explaining how it might 
propagate from a chatarrera. 
I attended this meeting expecting this sort of interaction: defensiveness from the 
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chatarreros, loquacious scientific speechifying from the MINSA authorities. What I did not 
expect was the candid appeal to environmental stewardship on the part of the chatarreros that 
followed. One by one, the chatarreros—mostly men, but a few women—rose to explain to the 
director that they were “responsible” businesspeople. They were quite aware of the stigma of 
dealing in garbage, but, they repeated over and over again, “If we did not have this business, 
where would the garbage go? Who would you blame then?” The chatarreros, they argued, were 
“cleaning up” the city. Moreover, they were providing “employment.”  The director’s pyramid 
had yet another rung, even lower and even wider, made up of churequeros, for whom wealthy 
Nicaraguans had an entomological nickname: hormigas (ants), presumably because a churequero 
carrying a giant sack of empty bottles or cans resembles an ant lugging an improbably large 
morsel of food. 
“Who are our clients?” One man asked, impatiently. “They are the old, the children, the 
most poor. If you move us out of the city, where will they go? Are you going to ask an old man 
to walk five, six kilometers out of town so he can survive? This is their survival!” The brokers 
were styling themselves less as sanitary citizens than as responsible patrons. 
To Don Eliseo Ordoñez, it was not surprising that MINSA launched the Plan Chatarra 
when it did, in April 2008. Don Eliseo was the owner of one of Nicaragua’s four largest 
chatarreros, a patron to many small family chatarreros, and a leader in the Association of 
Recyclers of Nicaragua (Asociación de Recicladores de Nicaragua, or ASORENIC).  His 
business was one of collection and export. He bought aluminum, plastic, paper, and assorted 
metals in bulk, loaded them onto shipping containers, and sent them abroad. The destinations of 
these shipments tended to be in Asia, particularly China, where a boom in construction meant 
high demand for cheap raw material.  Don Eliseo was politically and socially active. Among 
  14 
other things, he had been involved in the years before Ortega and the FSLN returned to power 
with an effort to lobby the Association of Nicaraguan Municipalities to replace municipal 
garbage collection services with private firms such as his. Starting in 2002, ASORENIC began to 
style itself as a pro-environment, pro-health organization. That year, it generated a press release 
promoting the recycling business as a way to connect Managua to a globalizing world, asking, 
“If they can do it in Miami, in Los Angeles, in Mexico, in Guatemala, in Costa Rica, or in any 
other country in the world, why NOT in NICARAGUA?” When the Ministry of Health initiated 
the Plan Chatarra, ASORENIC again began making the case that the private sector—not the 
state—could best handle urban sanitation. The firms would pay the cities for the right to collect 
valuable garbage and profit by selling the vastly increased volume they would yield. Given that 
projects like the rebuilding of Ciudad Sandino’s infrastructure in the days after Hurricane Mitch 
relied upon private enterprise, such a proposal might not have seemed so far-fetched. 
Don Eliseo had no doubt that MINSA had hatched the Plan Chatarra as a response to a 
political opportunity created by the churequeros’ protests. The protests had been covered 
extensively in the national television and print media, and Managua’s dump, “La Chureca,” was 
already a high-profile stain on the government’s reputation. It was the largest open-air waste 
facility in Central America, and it had become a regular tour stop for photographers and NGO 
activists looking either to expose environmental damage and extreme poverty. Ciudad Sandino’s 
“chureca” was a similar if less well-known site. Located just a few steps away from a large, 
private charity health clinic, Ciudad Sandino’s dump was also regularly visited by foreign 
volunteer and aid groups. Given the proliferation of painful images of dumps and their 
inhabitants on television, the Internet, and in newspapers, Don Eliseo explained, Ortega’s new 
FSLN government was under pressure to do something. The protests against city garbage 
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collectors who seemed to be skimming resources from their needy residents could not have come 
at a worse time. They had further undermined the public’s trust in city services. 
As a result of the protests, Don Eliseo told me, “the government realized how lucrative 
the business is, and they are setting up these restrictions on us so that they can take it over.” To 
Don Eliseo, the Plan Chatarra was nothing more than parasitism. The government was using the 
pretense of dengue to disrupt a long-standing and productive set of reciprocal patron-client 
relationships that linked large buyers like himself to street-level churequeros. For the business-
minded leaders of ASORENIC, the solution to the health problems posed by garbage was not a 
crackdown on scavenging but a formalization of it. Such a formalization would modernize 
Nicaragua, improve health, and—presumably—allow private businesses to handle a problem that 
the corrupt state was clearly ill-equipped to address. When the Plan Chatarra was put into action, 
“family” chatarreros cited their role in “cleaning” the city and giving the poorest of the poor a 
chance to make a living. Large chatarreros like Don Eliseo took this narrative of environmental 
stewardship one step further, playing on the struggles of the poor and trumpeting the market to 
frame the garbage trade as a “comedy of the commons,” in which harvesting waste seemed like a 
solution to, rather than a symptom of, the ravages of poverty (Rose 1986; Hardin 1968). 
Don Eliseo’s suspicions about a vast state conspiracy notwithstanding, in mid-2008, 
Ciudad Sandino and the rest of Managua were facing the onset of another dengue epidemic, and 
traders were seeing record highs in the prices of recyclable materials. The number of chatarreras 
and churequeros was swelling, it seemed, alongside the number of dengue cases. The correlation 
between this market surge and the epidemic surge was circumstantial rather than causal, but it 
had power nonetheless. 
There is little doubt that the spaces where garbage changes from waste to commodity 
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sometimes overlap with the spaces where mosquitoes reproduce and spread disease. Mosquitoes, 
therefore, actively mediated the conflict of economic and environmental management that was 
occurring at the height of Ciudad Sandino’s garbage boom. Waste and mosquitoes “explained 
each other” (Robbins 2012:95). City garbage collection services, however partial, depended on 
the idea that the solution to environmental problems began in homes. For residents who had 
access to regular curbside pickup, a failure to dump signaled a glaring absence of social 
responsibility—of sanitary citizenship. Those who insisted on harboring garbage in their homes 
were named and shamed by their neighbors. A similar discourse surrounded the management of 
mosquitoes. Mosquitoes were a public problem that originated in private space. People who 
refused to have their homes purged of insects faced public rebuke. In the more marginal barrios 
where scavengers resided, however, the division of space and responsibility into stark categories 
of public and private did not make as much sense. Houses in these areas were much more 
tenuously private. Many churequeros had constructed their homes out of donated material, on 
land they did not own. Others were deep in debt to private electrical and water companies. 
Churequeros who had no legal title to their own houses showed me power bills that reached into 
the tens of thousands of córdobas. In the face of aggressive bill collectors, house abandonments 
were a fairly common occurrence. Residents thus had trouble seeing the upkeep of their homes 
as a long-term private interest, much less a public one. 
The idea that dengue “hot spots” can be localized by identifying “high-risk” zones like 
chatarreras or the homes of churequeros is more easily postulated than proven (Adams and 
Kapan 2009).  Ae. aegypti are highly adapted to human movements, breed in small colonies, and 
are difficult to isolate. In addition, most dengue cases are asymptomatic. Absent a massive 
sample of human blood for evidence of latent dengue antibodies, there was no practical way that 
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MINSA could have proven that hot spots existed around chatarreros. The Plan Chatarra raised 
pressing questions about how to regulate a disease with no cure or effective prophylactic, in an 
environment where overcoming poverty often trumped other collective priorities, including 
health and sanitation. 
 
The Moral Economy of Mosquito Control 
The Plan Chatarra linked the recycling business to disease, but it was more than the fact 
that chatarreros traded in garbage that bothered MINSA officials. After all, as Don Eliseo and 
other chatarreros reminded me, “We are helping to clean up Nicaragua.” The problem was the 
manner in which they traded. More insidious still, as was noted both in published press accounts 
and in the June meeting between the director of Ciudad Sandino’s health center and the local 
brokers, was the proximity of “small,” “family” recycling brokerages to private homes.5 
Chatarreros were bad neighbors.  Still, MINSA’s efforts to regulate them failed to change the 
system just as completely as did the churequeros’ efforts to secure rights to scavenge. That 
failure stemmed in part from the sheer ambition of the Plan Chatarra. Ending garbage scavenging 
once and for all would have been nearly impossible. The plan did nevertheless strain the 
relationship of “client” chatarreros to large “patron” brokers like Don Eliseo. 
In early summer 2008, the small chatarreros of Ciudad Sandino learned that an advocacy 
alliance was being formed. An environmental NGO that also claimed to represent banana 
plantation workers injured by the pesticide Nemagon was being financed by ASORENIC, the 
consortium of Managua’s largest garbage brokers, to organize opposition to the Plan Chatarra. 
By paying a membership fee to the NGO, Ciudad Sandino’s chatarreros would receive a card 
that identified them as “recyclers,” along with a small diploma, and a blue-green, earth-themed 
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sticker to place on their front doors. The sticker read, “We the Chatarreros of Nicaragua demand 
that the government respect us and allow us to work for the daily bread of our children. God 
bless this nation. Yes to work! No to unemployment!” Like the churequeros, these normally 
independent actors would band together, making a moral case for their rights to collect and sell 
waste. 
Doña Nubia was one of the first to join. She opened up a chatarrera in her small house 
near the main entrance to Ciudad Sandino around 2007. She had lived there since the 1980s, 
when the revolutionary government gave her land as compensation for her husband’s death in an 
industrial accident. For most of her life, she had been a street vendor, selling juices and flavored 
ice at the bus stop near the barrio’s entrance. As she got older, that work became a strain on her 
knees and back, and her son, who owned a small pickup truck, suggested that she begin work as 
a chatarrera. Doña Nubia’s chatarrera was typical of the cottage industry that blossomed and 
withered in the space of a few short “boom” years in the late 2000s. Her main tool was a heavy-
duty scale, of the kind that was common in meat or grain stalls in Managua’s markets. It was a 
bronze, spring-calibrated mechanism with a sharp hook attached to one end and an eye attached 
to the other. Doña Nubia had it nailed to a rafter overhanging her small front porch. On a large 
piece of scrap roofing metal, her son had fashioned a sign, in black paint, that read “se compra 
chatarra.” Churequeros, local schoolchildren, and neighbors would arrive with sacks of plastic, 
aluminum, steel, copper, or other items (usually presorted), and Doña Nubia would weigh them 
and pay a per-pound rate, which she set by taking a small reduction from the rate she would 
receive from a larger buyer in Managua. Then she would empty the bag into one of the larger 
piles of like materials that dotted her patio. When the piles became large enough (or the price 
spiked high enough), her son would load them into the pickup and sell them to a trusted patron. 
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Like most of the twenty-six other chatarreros in Ciudad Sandino, Doña Nubia was visited 
by representatives of ASORENIC’s environmental NGO, who convinced her to pay and join. As 
they explained, dengue was a danger, but the real problem was that the government was 
overregulating the garbage, a nuisance to be sure, but also an “inexhaustible resource.” If they 
would let the chatarreros treat it for what it was, health and wealth would both improve. During 
our interview at his office, Don Eliseo showed me a PowerPoint presentation he had prepared for 
municipal governments interested in privatizing their garbage services. Its concluding slide 
contained green words on a gray background: Basura=$ (Garbage equals money). As one of his 
own business circulars noted, “Chatarra represents a great source of income, not just for its 
owner, but for the country, if we just take advantage of it.” Don Eliseo was linking the 
commoditization of garbage to the achievement of health and wealth. MINSA’s renewed zeal for 
regulating recycling, he insisted, had little to do with health. 
This, as it turned out, wasn’t Don Eliseo’s first fight against the health ministry. 
ASORENIC had been confronted by MINSA in 2002 over accusations that the industry’s 
dependence on informal collection networks was bad for public health. That year, ASORENIC 
sent MINSA an open letter, portraying chatarreros as a group of petty patrons, “Recycling 
businesspeople, the vast majority of whom are humble, honest, hardworking people, have found 
a way to make a living, improve their economic situation, and PROVIDE WORK TO 
THOUSANDS OF NICARAGUANS.” In 2002, MINSA and the rest of the Nicaraguan 
government were run by a largely pro-business, center-right regime. This message had a supply-
side tint that was missing from the “bottom-up” flavor of the 2008 response to MINSA sanctions.  
The 2008 response was built not around talk of trickle-down economics but around the colorful, 
earth-themed environmental logo. Though the environmental alliance ASORENIC formed was 
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shaky, the quick organization of patron and client chatarreros against MINSA proved somewhat 
effective. The literally and metaphorically “green” logo started popping up on the walls of 
chatarreros all around town. 
Then September came, and everything changed. The bottom fell out of the scrap metal 
industry, as the global financial crisis slowed world trade to a crawl. Indeed, in the words of 
Hilario Zepeda, a chatarrero who was elected to Ciudad Sandino’s municipal council on the 
FSLN ticket earlier in 2008, once the prices went down and the churequeros’ dump protests were 
out of the news, MINSA seemed to forget about them. But he and every other chatarrero I met in 
Ciudad Sandino also reported that ASORENIC and the environmental NGO had also 
disappeared. 
“I think [the NGO] just wanted us to pay our inscription fees, to buy our little ID cards 
and be done with us,” said Doña Nubia, whose business failed to survive the price crash. “They 
won’t be back. MINSA won’t be back.” 
Doña Lesbia, a chatarrera who lived in Zona 8, concurred. In hindsight, she couldn’t 
understand why the NGO identification card said “recycler” and not chatarrera. Recycling 
seemed like the act of a conscientious consumer, not a trader.  She didn’t think of herself as in 
any particular way as an environmentalist. The truth was, “chatarra is a dirty thing. It’s 
something that dirties you.” A younger woman with little experience in the trade, Doña Lesbia 
was approached by a large buyer in Managua who wanted to make an inroad in Zona 8. He 
loaned her a scale and taught her about how to weigh and value copper, aluminum, bronze, steel, 
and plastic. When the crash ended her relationship with that patron, she, like Doña Nubia, had to 
diversify. When I met her, she was in the process of starting a door-to-door tortilla business. She 
kept the “recycler” sticker on the wall of her patio (she liked its bright colors), but as a small 
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chatarrera, she no longer mattered, either as an object of state scrutiny or as a symbol of 
“sustainable” capitalism. 
Doña Lesbia’s ambivalence about being called a “recycler” was telling. Perhaps she was 
aware of her status as a vulnerable “middle person,” a parasitic figure in a pyramid scheme 
dominated by large interests like Don Eliseo’s. She had come to see what other churequeros were 
seeing: in a commoditized landscape, the kinds of rights a poor person could assert—including 
the rights that come with clientage—began to shrink (Purcell 2002).  Recycling was part of a 
survival strategy, but it was hard to turn it into a civic action. “Rights” to collect were not given. 
MINSA lacked the power to convince people in greater Managua that the junk business 
as it was—an open range where technological, political, and monetary might determined who 
had resource rights—might be dangerous enough to public health to be regulated. The more 
garbage circulated, the less it seemed to be a common concern. Or perhaps Don Eliseo was onto 
something—perhaps the Ortega government wanted to add chatarra to the list of industries in 
which it had a major stake and from which it could provide a lucrative outlet for loyalists.6 In an 
ecological sense, mosquitoes and the virus had taken advantage of the situation, thriving in a set 
of spaces (dumps, streets, parks, and gutters) that were neither public nor private, neither 
common nor collective. 
“Dirtiness,” as Doña Lesbia reminded me, was “part of the business.” 
 
Patrons, Clients, and Parasites 
The last time we spoke, shortly before she closed the chatarrera, Doña Nubia told me the 
story of how her neighbor’s child was stricken with dengue. “The child got sick, and soon 
MINSA and the neighbors were coming here telling me that the mosquitoes came from me.” She 
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paused. “Do you think that’s possible?” she asked, “that a mosquito from here made her sick? 
There are clouds of mosquitoes in Ciudad Sandino.” 
She paused again and looked pensively in the direction of her neighbors’ house. 
Neighborhood FSLN activists eager to carry out the Plan Chatarra had fueled the accusation that 
the child’s sickness was her fault. “They’ll be happy now because now I’m not buying anything 
anymore.” She threw her hands up in the direction of the last pile of scrap metal in the corner of 
her porch. By the time of our last conversation, in November 2008, few people were coming by 
to sell chatarra. In any case, Doña Nubia could rarely afford to buy it, given the depth to which 
prices had fallen. So the material sat there, rusting and collecting the last of the seasonal rains. 
And Doña Nubia sat beside it, pondering the lives of mosquitoes, of the little girl—now, 
thankfully, fully recovered from her bout with dengue—and of rumors from her fellow 
chatarreros about the prospect of a market recovery: a recovery that might make her solvent once 
again, but might also, once again, make her the object of neighborly and state scorn. 
In the Plan Chatarra, it was small operators like Doña Nubia who received the bulk of 
MINSA’s attention. In an anti-dengue crusade built on a hygienic premise, that clean homes 
harbored few mosquitoes while “dirty” ones were potential breeding spots, this made perfect 
sense. It also made sense that the connection between chatarra and dengue became strongest 
when the market was strongest. Intuitively, it would appear that a strong market for recyclables 
could produce a cleaner and maybe even “healthier” city. What better incentive to clean than 
money? Yet the market could do little to produce a sense of ethical or social connection. Indeed, 
combined with a mounting series of dengue epidemics, the growth in the garbage market actually 
turned certain spaces and the bodies that occupied them into dangerous internal threats. Along 
the way, it destabilized the patron-client system that regulated the circulation of garbage. Under 
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stable circumstances, chatarreros and churequeros, even as “dirty workers,” could rightfully 
claim to be improving public space. The soaring market, however, brought the details of the 
trade to broader attention. All of a sudden, churequeros and chatarreros appeared dangerously 
unconcerned with the quality of private spaces: of their own homes and bodies. It was their 
seeming disregard for the interior worlds they shared with mosquitoes that made them suitable 
objects of scorn. 
The churequeros and chatarreros certainly made easy targets as public health officials in 
Nicaragua searched for someone to blame for the ever-mounting number of dengue cases. 
Scavenging disrupts standard narratives about the proper relationship between people and the 
things they buy, sell, and consume. People tend to characterize waste as polluting and dangerous, 
and turning it into value seems to violate basic norms about the proper way to make a living (see 
Douglas 2002 [1966]; Moore 2008).  The economic lives of the chatarrero and the churequero 
seem somehow “parasitic.” These actors thrive by milking the dark underside of a larger system 
of trade and consumption.  
In another sense, however, chatarreros and churequeros were themselves beset by 
parasites. As clients, the churequeros and chatarreros of Ciudad Sandino depended upon the 
buying power of large patrons in Managua and beyond. Chatarreros and churequeros provided 
cheap, free labor for these well-capitalized entities, as well as for the city planners who—
whether they openly admitted it or not—depended upon an army of hormigas to keep the streets 
minimally clean. The assignment of blame rested not only on ideas about the ethics of seeking 
profit from the waste that was so prominent in the urban landscape but also on normative ideas 
about ecology. The spaces that brigadistas and MINSA officials called focos (or what English-
speaking entomologists sometimes call mosquito “hot spots”), from piles of garbage to flower 
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pots, were essential for the reproduction of life in the city. The mosquito, too, seemed to behave 
in a parasitic fashion, feeding and breeding opportunistically among humans in these same spots. 
Parasitic relationships tend to complement and build upon one another. It is impossible to 
disaggregate the parasitic relationships between scavengers and large brokers from those 
between mosquitoes and people. Householders in poor cities cannot survive without scavenging. 
The global consumer economy arguably cannot thrive without the work of informal scavengers. 
Mosquitoes cannot spread without the help of the human garbage trade. Mosquitoes and garbage 
do something more than make people sick; they are productive of political and social 
relationships.  
Seeing human and insect lives as entangled makes it difficult to argue that a will to 
sanitary citizenship—the kind of will that mosquito control programs are meant to instill—
inevitably results from membership in a “consumer society.” One of the lessons of both studies 
of parasitic relations in nature and those of patron-client relations in Latin American social life is 
that the terms of such relations are interchangeable. Beyond anthropocentrism, there is no 
necessary reason to see viruses or mosquitoes (both of which are much more abundant on Earth 
than are human beings) as thriving parasitically upon humans. It seems just as reasonable to say 
that epidemics of dengue, avian influenza, and the like are the result of human parasitism: 
exploitation of global resources, excess consumption, global warming, and the like. Likewise, in 
the patron-client relationship, who is behaving parasitically and who is being preyed upon 
depends upon one’s point of view. Are garbage scavengers milking the city’s material excess, or 
is the city milking the labor of scavengers to keep those excesses out of sight and out of mind? 
Power resides among those who can identify and neutralize parasites and clients.   
Philosopher Michel Serres (2007 [1982]) argues that parasitic relations—relations of 
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disruption and disturbance—are the norm rather than an exception in social life.  For global 
health, the parasite is a device for thinking of the ways in which environments are inhabited—
constantly made and unmade—rather than simply occupied.  While this volume is dedicated to 
exploring “resistance” in global health, parasitism might be a productive alternative.  In 
Nicaragua, a local manifestation of a global health policy (dengue mosquito control) disrupted a 
local economy, but the reverse was also the case.  Parasitism emphasizes multidirectional 
“noise” over binary acts of domination and resistance.  In Nicaragua, a local conflict masked the 
global contradiction that increased consumption of disposable goods, even among the poor, 
makes parasites of almost everyone. Cities, and certain groups within them, become both reviled 
for their association with waste and indispensable to the reproduction of the economy. 
In Nicaragua, parasitism happened at both a material and a symbolic level. At the 
material level, the fact that dengue mosquitoes could potentially find a harbor in otherwise 
valuable waste made these wastes even more abject. At a symbolic level, the circulation of 
wastes and mosquitoes through urban space—private, public, collective, and in-between—
altered the social meanings of those spaces. From a free-market point of view, for-profit 
recycling might be seen as a cure to the environmental ravages of urban life, and the chatarrera 
might be a site of a kind of “green capitalism,” while from MINSA’s point of view, the same 
space could be one of risk and danger, or a threat to social solidarity.  The connections between 
waste and dengue are far from direct, but neither are those between scavenging and 
sustainability. The absence of clear rights, whether those of churequeros to make a living from 
the dump, of the city government to regulate and resell refuse in the name of the public interest, 
or of MINSA to make the health implications of the postconsumer economy a point of public 
consideration, ultimately benefited large operators like Don Eliseo—and small ones, like Ae. 
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aegypti. 
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